JOHN BUR ID AN AND NICHOLAS OF AUTRECOURT ON CAUSALITY AND INDUCTION
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The names of John B uridan (1300-after 1358) and Nicholas of A utrecourt (1300-after 1350) are often associated w ith the so-called Ockhamist statu te of 1340 a t th e University of Paris. For a long tim e the discussion centered upon the question: Was this statu te directed against Ockham or A utrecourt? Puz zling also was the p art B uridan played, who presum ably was rector a t the tim e th a t the statu te was prom ulgated. Should he, as an alleged 'Ockham ist,' be accused of patricide or did he defend Ockham against the attacks of A utre court?1
It cannot be denied th a t some fundam ental differences of opinion existed between B uridan and A utrecourt. As the central topic of this paper I have selected their difference of opinion on induction and causality because it re . These authors have situated the 1340 statu te among a num ber of other statutes, all of which have to do w ith the m aintainance of discipline a t the university. This sta tu te is not concerned w ith specific philosophical positions, b u t with styles of reasoning, and it is difficult to argue th a t th e practices proscribed in the body of the docum ent are in accordance with those of Ockham. In addition, th e external evidence asso ciating the 1340 sta tu te w ith Ockhamism is very flimsy. The rubric 'S tatu tu m facultatis de reprobatione quorundam errorum O ckhanicorum' is an interpolation. The references in the P rocurator's Book of the English-G erm an nation and in an oath formula of 1341 were proved to be references to quite another sta tu te which is lost. This lost statu te, prom ulgated in Jan u ary -F eb ru ary 1341, contained prohibitions against the 'scientia O kamica.' W ithout going further into this question, it suffices to say th a t it was directed against a group of members a t the English N ation and was related to issues such as O ckham's views on universals, his reinterpretation of the categories, and th e effects on the understanding of physics. It had nothing to do with Ockham 's theological opinions. veals something about their concept of science, th a t is, about the possibility of achieving certain knowledge of reality. First, their views on causality will be discussed, then those on induction.
Some aspects of our subject have been treated by Anneliese Maier. Against her opinion I will argue th a t the differences between B uridan and A utrecourt lie not so much in the degree of certainty which has to be attached to inductive knowledge, but rather in the more fundam ental problem of causality. It is precisely because of their different views on the relation between cause and effect th a t A utrecourt and B uridan appraise inductive knowledge differently.2 Induction is only possible if a more or less regular behavior of natural agents is assumed. By elucidating B uridan's views on causality, we m ay provide the broader context of his treatm en t of induction.
In addition, I w ant to make it clear th a t it is very unlikely th a t B uridan was carrying on a controversy w ith Autrecourt. In m ost treatm ents of the relation between Buridan and Autrecourt -whether in connection with the 1340 stat ute or not -it is taken for granted th a t B uridan had explicitly A utrecourt in mind when refuting a certain line of reasoning.3 Although the same line of reasoning does occur in A utrecourt and plays a central role in his doctrine, I nevertheless think th a t B uridan was not referring to it. The way Buridan reproduces this argum entation seems to exclude this possibility. 4 Finally, I may m ake a small contribution to the solution of some problems which remained unsolved in an article by Scott.5
I. Ca u s a l i t y
Basic to the teaching of Nicholas of A utrecourt is the opinion th a t all evident knowledge m ust be reducible to the prim um principium , the principle of non contradiction. An inference yields evident knowledge only when the affirm a tion of its antecedens and the negation of its consequens are contradictory. This means th a t the antecedent and the consequent -or, still better, w hat is signi fied by the antecedent and the consequent -m ust be identical, 'because if this were not the case, it would not be im m ediately evident th a t the antecedent and the opposite of the consequent cannot stand together w ithout contradic tio n .'6 It is within the context of this theory of evident knowledge th a t A utre court launched his attack on causality, th a t is, on the relations which are supposed to exist between causes and their effects. The fundam entals of his critique were well analysed by J. R. W einberg.7
A utrecourt m aintained th a t there are no logical reasons th a t posit an evident relation between a cause and an effect. Thus, the inference 'Ignis est approxim atus stuppe, et non est im pedim entum ; ergo calor erit' is not evident. Be cause th e antecedent and the consequent are distinct, it is not contradictory to state th a t there is no heat. However, if we interpret the proposition in a way in which the antecedent and consequent are identical, the argum ent is merely verbal, because the antecedent is interpreted in such a way th a t it implies the consequent.8
The above argum ent is taken from A utrecourt's second Letter to Bernard of Arezzo. The same line of reasoning may be found in his Letter to Aegidius. In connection with Aegidius' rem ark th a t natural agents, under proper circum stances, cause the existence of their effects, A utrecourt replies : (A) Dico hie, quod, si per agentia naturalia intelligatis: 'Ista agentia, que sunt approximata passivis et non impedita sunt, ponunt suas actiones esse,' dicendo quod optime sequitur: Agens naturale est approximatum passivo et non est impedimentum, ergo est actio. Sed dico, quod non est evidens evidentia de scripta alicui, quod in rerum universitate sint talia agentia, ymo nec quod sint ponibilia. Nam demonstratis omnibus, que sunt requisita ad effectus, potero sustinere sine aliqua contradictione, que posset inferri contra me, quod effec tus huiusmodi non erit. New York 1969), who (18-19) translates the pas sage cited in n. 6. 8 For the L atin te x t see Lappe, . For example, when the antecedent is in terp ret ed to mean 'fire is productive of heat if it is near a combustible substance and there is no im pedim ent, and it is next to the flax which is combustible and there is no im pedim ent. ' Cf. Weinberg, (B) Item, in concursu causarum potero rationabiliter credere vel dubitare sal tern, utrum ibi sit aliquod agens, cuius actio sit necessario requisita ad positionem talis effectus, et per consequens non debeo credere, quod omnibus istis rebus positis necessario effectus debeat esse necessitate tali, quod sit contradictio alio modo se habere, ut ex premissis satis patet.9
In the first p art of the argum entation (A) the point is th a t the inference from cause to effect is either tautological or not. If tautological, we have no indica tion th a t there is really something like a causal connection. If not, the antece dent (which expresses the cause) and the consequent (which expresses the effect) are distinct and it is not contradictory to assert th a t the cause exists and the effect does not.10 I w ant to stress -perhaps superfluously-th a t A utrecourt w ith this last claim is not pointing a t the so-called contingency of the effects. It was a common doctrine in the th irteen th and fourteenth centuries th a t agentia naturalia operate with necessity, b u t th a t their effects m ay be prevented. W ith such agents it is not contradictory to say th a t the cause exists and the effect does not because the latter m ight have been impeded per accidens by some other cause or because God has miraculously intervened in nature.11 Christian theology required the belief in several kinds of divine intervention, th a t is, in several exceptions to the A ristotelian explanation of nature. The best-known examples of such supernatural events were the existence of the accidents of bread and wine w ithout their proper subject in the Sacram ent of the E ucha rist; the angel of Tobias who took tem porarily the form of a hum an being (rendering it impossible to prove from effects like eating, drinking, etc., th a t the formal cause of th a t body is the hum an soul); and, finally, the three chil dren who were com itted to the flames by king Nebuchadnezzar, but not burned, due to the miraculous intervention of God.12 In all these cases the effect had been impeded by divine intervention.
A utrecourt's claim, however, is much stronger, because he explicitly ex cludes such an im pedim ent ('non est im pedim entum '), and declares th a t the effect may, nevertheless, not exist. We cannot achieve logical certitude about the existence of necessary relations between cause and effect, because, as we have seen, knowledge of one thing (cause/effect) is never sufficient for evident knowledge of another thing (effect/cause). His point is th a t intuitive and perfect knowledge of a thing never suffices for the knowledge of another thing, unless one has previous knowledge of th a t other thing. Applied to the knowledge of a cause this means:
cognoscere causam sub ratione causae praesupponit notitiam illius rei quae est effectus.14 Ockham 's point m ay be expressed^-somewhat anachronistically -as follows: the assignm ent of an event to a cause is a 'theory-laden' undertaking.15 It presupposes knowledge of the effect which, in our conceptual framework, is connected w ith th a t cause. By designating a certain something as a cause, one has already structured reality, because one cannot speak of cause, unless one has -a t least tacitly -some notion of th e effect. In other words, experience of causal relations is a condition of knowing a thing sub ratione causae. It is precisely in connection with this point th a t induction plays a role in this dis pute. I will return to this aspect a little later.
The second p a rt of the argum entation (B) in A utrecourt's Letter to Aegidius m ust be seen against the background of the doctrine th a t God may be the sole cause of any effect. The epistemological significance of this hypothesis is th a t inferences th a t are not evident in the first place (such as the existence of secondary effects from secondary causes) do not become evident through addi tional qualifications, such as: God did not supernaturally produce any effects, b u t nature took its common course. It is a line of reasoning which A utrecourt had elaborated in his first Letter to Bernard of Arezzo:
Nam quando aliquis non est certus de aliquo consequente nisi mediante aliquo antecedente, de quo an ita sit, sicut significat, non est certus evidenter, quia nec illud est notum ex terminis nec experientia, nec ex talibus deductis, sed tantum est creditum: talis non est evidenter certus de consequente.16
The qualification as to whether the referent of the conclusion was naturally or supernaturally produced does not alter the certainty of the conclusion. Our knowledge remains the same and, as A utrecourt had already established, we possess no evident knowledge of causal relations. Moreover, it is impossible to know when the qualification should be made, th a t is, when we should suppose th a t God has miraculously intervened or th a t nature has followed its communis cursus.11
John B uridan elaborated his views on causality in his com m entary on the Physics, Book I q. 4: 'U trum in omni scientia ex preexistenti cognitione princi piorum, causarum et elem entorum contingit alia scire, scilicet principiata, cau sata et elem entata?'18 The title already shows th a t this question will say a great deal about causality. The question refers to the well-known teaching of A ristotle th a t we have scientific knowledge of an object only if we know the principles, causes, and elements of th a t object (P hys. 184al-16) . It is precisely within the context of this question th a t B uridan tries to give a reply to w hat has been regarded as the argum ent of A utrecourt. B uridan restates this argu m ent in th e argum ents quod non, th a t is, in the objections to his own position:
Item revertor ad arguendum quod non posset fieri notum unum ex alio, quia de uno ad aliud non est consequentia evidens, propter hoc quod consequentia non est evidens nisi secundum reductionem ad primum principium, quia pri mum principium fundatur in contradictione, et contradictio debet esse Copulatio autem inter id quod rep u tatu r ad m odum causae, et id quod rep u tatu r causatum , non est necessaria apud nos. Sed omnia duo, quorum hoc non est illud, nec illud hoc, et affirm atio unius non includit affirm ationem alterius, nec negatio unius inclu dit negationem alterius, non est ex necessitate esse unius esse alterius, nec ex necessitate privationis unius u t p rivetur alterum .' This work (in Arabie: Tahafut al-Tahafut) is m eant to be a refutation of Algazel's Tahafut al-Falasifa. Averroes' procedure is to cite passages from Algazel's Tahafut and then to state his argum ents for or against his position. It is from one B uridan starts his determinatio by observing th a t his quaestio implies two further questions: (1) May we infer knowledge of one thing from knowledge of another thing? (2) W hat kind of things are causes or principles and w hat kind are effects?
Phys. I q. 4 fol. 5ra: (A) Ista quaestio et rationes ad eam adducta implicant in se plures difficultates. Una difficultas est utrum ex notitia unius potest fieri notitia alterius .... (fol. 6ra) (B) Alia difficultas, scilicet cum dicimus ex causis vel principiis scire principiata et causata, quae res sint illae causae vel illa principia, et quae res sint etiam illa principiata vel causata.21
In connection w ith the first question (A) B uridan sets out to refute the claim th a t all knowledge should be reducible to the principle of non-contradiction -th a t is, to the only principle which is, according to A utrecourt, perm itted in science. B uridan first tries to refute this claim for incomplex knowledge, th a t is, knowledge on a prediscursive level. The discussion is restricted to the knowl edge of substances. W ithout going into too much detail, it is clear th a t Buridan 's account of the question does not m atch the way A utrecourt had posed it. B uridan describes the problem as follows. Some people assert th a t no incomplex knowledge may be obtained from other incomplex knowledge, un less by way of inference. B ut an inference is solely from complex knowledge to complex knowledge, th a t is, from propositions to other propositions.22 As a corollary these people infer:
Quod nullam substantiam cognoscimus notitia incomplexa, quia non venimus in notitia substantiarum nisi per notitiam accidentium; igitur in virtute ali cuius consequentiae, quae non est nisi complexorum.23
The 'quidam' of B uridan seem to have held the position th a t we have no intuitive knowledge of substances because knowledge of substances is discur sive. This, however, is not the position defended by Autrecourt. In the first place, A utrecourt denied explicitly th a t we have an intuitive cognition of sub stances. Furtherm ore, he also denied th a t we have discursive knowledge of substances, 'quia ex una re non potest inferri quod alia res sit.' We are not allowed to make a 'jum p' from the existence of the accidents (which we per such citation th a t our passage was taken. The te x t cited here is from a Renaissance version. The earliest translation into L atin dates from 1328 (by Calonymos I He reproduces two argum ents of his anonymous opponents. The first objec tion is th a t only a conclusion which is reducible to the prim um principium is evident. B u t it is not possible to find a middle term in a syllogism where the existence of a is inferred from the existence of b. If one takes the proposition la is b' as a middle, the existence of a has already been assumed and the question begged.26
In the second objection which B uridan reproduces, it is argued th a t in a syllogism one should use all the premisses. B ut the proposition 'a is b' could in this way never become a premiss in a dem onstration for the existence of a, because the conclusion 'a is' is im mediately inferred from 'a is b,' w ithout the help of th e other premiss.27
Basically the problem is th a t the proposition 'a is V is a necessary premiss for any inference which should be reducible to the principle of non-contradiction. F or in this premiss the identity of the antecedent (b) and the conclusion (a) is stated. Both argum ents, however, try to show th a t 'a is b' is unsuited to function as premiss in a logical inference of the existence of a from the exist ence of b. In this way, B uridan's opponents have succeeded in proving their point th a t such inferences are invalid. Their reasoning is thus quite different from the position taken by A utrecourt.
I now tu rn to B uridan's reply. His first conclusion seeks to make clear the way in which the proposition 'a is b' may function in a syllogism. It is of no 24 Lappe, 11.25-12. Cf. Weinberg, Nicholas 38-40 for an exposition of A utrecourt's views. 25 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5va). 26 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5va): '... et quia v idetur eis quod impossibile sit dem onstrare aliquam conclusionem in qua affirm atur de aliquo subiecto hoc verbum " est" secundum adiacens, quia non potest inveniri medium quod esset notius de illo subiecto quam hoc verbum " est." Unde statim videtur quod in sillogismo esset petitio principii, verbi gratia volo dem onstrare quod a est et sillogismo sic: "b est" et "a est 6" ; igitur "a est." C onstat quod in minori propositione ego iam accipio quod a est. Non enim possum scire quod a est b, nisi prius vel simul sciam quod a est. ' 27 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5va): 'Item, in sillogismo dem onstrativo nec ad maiorem sine minore, nec ad minorem sine maiore debet sequi conclusio gratia formae, quia superflueret alia premissa. Sed ad istam "a est b" sequitur quod a est; igitur illa propositio "a est 6" non potest esse premissa ad sillogisandum dem onstrative quod a est.' interest to us here. The other three conclusions are more promising in connec tion with th e conflicting positions on causality and induction which we are considering. B uridan's general procedure here is to underm ine the basic as sum ption of his anonymous-opponents th a t there is b u t one principle in sci ence, th a t it is only from the primum principium, th a t certain knowledge may be inferred. As we have seen, this is also th e position defended by Autrecourt.
I illustrate B uridan's procedure with a few examples. In one conclusion he m aintains th a t we have dem onstrative knowledge of conclusions which are not reduced to the first principle. If we see a man, we know th a t he has a heart. The antecedent is clear from sense-perception; the consequent is certain when we have dem onstrated th a t m an cannot live w ithout a h eart.28 In this way we have inferred knowledge of the existence of b from knowledge of the existence of a.
In a rath er amusing anecdote in his com m entary on the Metaphysics, Buridan even casts doubt upon the certainty of the first principle. He asked some old women whether they could be sitting and not-sitting a t the same time. They said, of course, th a t they could not. He then pointed out to them th a t God is alm ighty and asked w hether they believed th a t God could make them sit and n o t sit a t the same time. They answered: We do not know.29 B u t the key passage for our problem is B uridan's second conclusion in ques tion 4 in his com m entary on the first book of the Physics. This conclusion provides a pream ble to his views on induction. His argum ent is th a t we know m any premisses of science w ithout having reduced them to the first principle. Knowledge of these premisses of a dem onstration is attained by sense-percep tion, memory, or experience.30 28 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6ra): 'Q uarta conclusio est quod in quibusdam per istam propositio nem "a est" non solitarie sed cum alia premissa ego possum dem onstrative scire istam conclu sionem " b est," licet a sit aliud quam b, et b aliud quam a. Verbi gratia, non est tibi notum ad sensum quod cor est, sed tibi est notum ad sensum quod homo est; igitur tu argues sic: " Si homo est, cor est; sed homo est; igitur cor est." Minor p a te t ad sensum, et maior erit nota quando dem onstratum erit quod non potest homo vivere sine corde.' Cf. also Maier, M etaphy sische Hintergründe 394 for a transcription. 30 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 5vb): 'Secunda conclusio contra illos est, quod non oportet omnem praem issam dem onstrationis fieri notam et evidentem per reductionem ad prim am princi pium. M ulta enim principia dem onstrationum fiunt nota nobis per sensum vel per memoriam vel per experientiam , absque hoc quod oporteat ea aliter dem onstrari, sicut habetur secundo Posteriorum .'
II. In d u c t i o n
This last rem ark of B uridan's refers to the way we m ay a ttain knowledge of the indem onstrable principles which are proper to a specific science. According to the A ristotelian notion of science, such principles serve as premisses in a demonstrative syllogism. Scientia (emarrj/urj) is, for Aristotle, knowledge of the dem onstrated conclusions; knowledge of the principles is referred to as intellectus (vovg). The problem is: In w hat way do we attain knowledge of the first principles? They cannot be dem onstrated, for this would imply an infinite regression. At the same time, Aristotle w anted to avoid the assum ption of a num ber of so-called basic tru th s which are not dem onstrated, for this would lead to dogm atism .31
In Posterior Analytics II 19 A ristotle dealt with this problem a t some length. He explicitly denied th a t knowledge of the first principles is innate. It m ust be obtained by man. Modern interpretations differ as to the way in which this knowledge is achieved according to Aristotle. His rem arks seem to point to a process of intuitive induction.32 The medieval com m entators on A ristotle were much clearer on this point than Aristotle himself. B uridan deals with the problem in his com m entary on the Metaphysics, Book II quaestio 2: 'U trum principia sint nobis habita n atu raliter.' Through sense-experience we recognize the principle 'This fire is w arm .' This sense-perception is stored in memory, and through repeated recollections of such perceptions we judge th a t even the fire we have not sensed is warm. This last judgem ent is founded on expe rience.33 For 'experientia est ex multis memoriis consimilium prius sensatorum iudicare de alio sim ili occurente.'34 33 In Metaph. II q .2 (fol. 9vab): 'E t ideo sciendum est, sicut determ inat Aristoteles in fine Posteriorum , quod aliqua sunt principia indem onstrabilia accepta per sensum, ut quod iste ignis est calidus. Alia autem accepta per memoriam, u t quod ignis quam heri tetigi fuit calidus. E t aliqua sunt accepta per experim entum , u t quod iste ignis quam scilicet ego < n o n > (ed. nunc) tango est calidus.' This passage has also been transcribed in Maier, 34 This definition may be found in In Metaph. I q. 8 (fol. 7va). It is illustrated by the same B ut this process still concerns singular principles like the knowledge th a t this fire is warm. B uridan m ust explain how the 'ju m p ' to a universal principle is made. In order to explain the way in which we arrive a t knowledge of first principles like 'All fire is w arm ,' or 'B hubarb cures cholera,' he posits the n atural inclination of our intellect to tru th (inclinatio naturalis ad veritatem). On encountering such a universal principle, the intellect assents to it-al though a t times only after long deliberation -because of our natural inclina tion to tru th .35 B uridan concludes th a t this process of gathering experience is nothing other th an the m ethod of induction:
Experientia ex multis sensationibus et memoriis deducta non est aliud quam inductio in multis singularibus, per quam intellectus, non videns instantiam nec rationem instandi, cogitur, ex eius naturali inclinatione ad veritatem, concedere propositionem universalem.36
These rem arks about knowledge of first principles are scattered over a num ber of questions. B uridan expounds his ideas system atically in his Quaestiones on the Posterior Analytics, b u t his exposition does not deviate from the posi tion sketched in the passage I have quoted. I m ay perhaps refer to one passage which provides some additional inform ation. In Book II, question 11 of his com m entary on the Posteriora Buridan stresses th a t knowledge of the princi ples is not discursive. Although the intellect uses the m ethod of induction, this m ethod is not in itself sufficient. It is by its own power th a t the intellect apprehends the first principles, precisely because it is naturally inclined to them .37
It was very common in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to explain knowledge of the first principles of science by a non-discursive, m ental process of induction. We find an account of this process not only in the commentaries example as was discussed above. The definition is A ristotelian 
H. Hubien (Liège). I am very grateful th a t he p u t his transcription of this te x t a t my disposal.
The question which is particularly relevant with regards to our subject is Book II q. 11 ('U trum notitia prim orum principiorum sit nobis in n ata '). From this question I quote the following passage: 'Ideo principiorum indem onstrabilium non est scientia proprie, sed eorum est habitus qui vocatur " intellectus," non quia sit ipsam et potentia intellectualis, sed pro tan to quia non v irtu te aliorum intellectorum assentit eis, sed v irtu te propria tanquam est naturaliter determ inatus .... E t ideo, licet intellectus indigeat inductione, tam en illa non est sufficiens ad determ inandum intellectum , nisi intellectus per suum naturam esset ad hoc inclinatus et determ inatus' (transcription of Prof. Hubien).
on the Posteriora by R obert Grosseteste38 and Thom as Aquinas,39 b u t also in the theological works of Duns Scotus and W illiam Ockham.40 It is interesting to observe th a t Scotus, Ockham, and B uridan seek to vali date the m ethod of induction. As we have already seen, for B uridan the ulti m ate ground for justifying the tru th of the inductively known principle was an 'inclinatio naturalis ad veritatem.' This becomes also very clear from a passage from his com m entary on the Metaphysics (Book II q. 1). In one of the argu m ents quod non it is argued th a t inductively known principles are false, quia experientiae ad concludendum universale principium non habent vim, nisi per modum inductionis in multis, et nunquam ex inductione sequitur universalis propositio, nisi sit inductum in omnibus singularibus illius univer salis, quod est impossibile.
B uridan meets this argum ent with a reference to the intellect's natural inclina tion to truth:
Ad aliam, quae dicit quod experientiae non valent ad concludendum princi pium universale, dico quod non est illatio gratia formae, sed intellectus per naturalem inclinationem suam ad verum, praedispositus per experientias, assentit universali principio.41
Scotus and Ockham appeal to a special principle to establish the tru th of an inductive generalization. Scotus describes this principle as a self-evident prop osition in the soul to the effect th a t 'Quicquid evenit u t in pluribus ab aliqua causa non libera est effectus naturalis illius causae.' If in m any cases an effect of a certain kind b follows upon a natural cause of a certain kind a, we may conclude th a t all a's can produce b's. Ockham assumed the following principle 'Causae eiusdem generis sunt effectivae effectuum eiusdem generis vel eiusdem rationis,' or, in other words, 'Like causes have like effects.' As soon as we are certain th a t a particular cause a is responsible for the production of the effect b, we may conclude -by way of the above-m entioned principle -th a t all a 's can cause b. According to Ockham 's account it m ust be certain th a t this particular a, and not some other cause, caused b.42 B oth Scotus and Ockham were of the opinion th a t their maxims about cau sality are self-evident. Scotus' theory was attacked by A utrecourt in his E xigit. A utrecourt's point is th a t Scotus' maxim is merely verbal. It provides a definition of a natural cause, but it is not possible to know when an agent will be a natural agent.43 The im position of the term causa naturalis to something is an a posteriori conclusion -th a t is, it depends on the experience of causal routines, and it is impossible to be certain th a t these same routines will hold in the future.44 In other words, our experience informs us only of frequency, not of invariability.
Furtherm ore, A utrecourt denies th a t we have experience of causal relations. We only have experience of conjunction. R epetition of these experiences m ay provoke a conjectural habit (habitus conjecturativus), the probable expectation th a t in the future the same conjunction will be observed.45 Nicholas' reasoning here is consistent with his position in the second Letter to Bernard. There too he argued th a t we do not even have probable experience of causal nexus, because aliquid non habet noticiam probabilem de aliquo consequente virtute alicuius antecedents, de quo non est evidenter certus utrum consequens fuerit aliquando simul cum antecedente. 'Cum probatur quod certitudo per propositionem quiescentem in anim a quae est "illud quod producitur u t in pluribus a causa non libera est effectus ejus n aturalis," quaero: Quid appellas causam n atu ralem ? Vel illam quae produxit praeteritum u t in pluribus et adhuc producet in futurum si du ret et applicetur? E t tunc m inor non est scita, esto quod aliquid sit productum u t in pluribus; non est tam en certum an sic debeat esse in fu tu ru m .' This passage has been analysed in Maier, 'Das Problem ' 390-91 and in W einberg, Nicholas 69-71. More or less the same criticism holds for Ockham. Experience of the regularity of nature is needed for expressing causal routines in a universal proposition. There is, however, no guarantee th a t the same routines will hold in the future.
45 Nicholas of A utrecourt, Exigit (237 39-41): 'T ertia decima conclusio est quod de scitis per experientiam illo modo quo dicitur sciri "rheubarbarum san at choleram " vel "adam as a ttra h it ferrum ," h abetur solum habitus conjecturativus, non certitudo.' 46 Lappe, 13.6-8. Cf. W einberg, Nicholas 111-12.
therm ore, according to A utrecourt induction provides only probable knowl edge. It is only w ith probability th a t we m ay anticipate th a t the same eventpairs will repeat themselves. Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan believed th a t some thing can be learned from induction, th a t induction can provide an insight in th e causal interconnections of phenomena.
If we now return to B uridan's views, recalling the context in which he made his statem ents, we observe th a t he does not adequately reply to his anonymous opponents. In his com m entary on the Physics I, the fourth question arose out of the fact th a t some people recognized only one principle of science, the prim um principium -a claim which rendered knowledge of causal relations impossible. Since B uridan was unable to accept this consequence, he a t tem pted to refute his opponents by showing th a t the first principle is not the only principle of scientific knowledge. As we have seen, one of his argum ents was th a t there are, as a m atter of fact, m any principles in science and th a t these principles are known by induction, th a t is, by sensory perception, mem ory, and experience. B ut here B uridan is begging the question, because in his account of the inductive process, he presupposes the possibility of knowledge of causal relations. It is exactly this kind of knowledge which is excluded by the claim th a t all evident knowledge should be reducible to the first principle. The presupposed knowledge of causal relations was his reason for attacking this claim in the first place.
A petitio principii would be, however, avoided, should it tu rn out th a t B uri dan does not attach the same degree of certainty to inductively known princi ples as to the first principle. His answer to this question m ay be found in the questions on the Metaphysics, Book II q. 1 ('U trum de rebus sit nobis possibilis comprehensio veritatis?'). There he posits a third kind of comprehensio veritatis which is relevant to this issue:
Alio modo comprehensio veritatis accipitur pro adhaesione vel assensu quo assentimus vel adhaerimus propositioni vere, et adhuc constat quod hoc est nobis possibile.
And the question is further specified:
Utrum talis assensus veritatis sit nobis possibilis cum certitudine,47 B uridan seems to m aintain th a t the certainty of our assent is of two kinds: simpliciter and secundum quid or ex suppositione (communis cursus naturae). The first kind of evidence appears when one is necessitated to assent to a proposition, because one cannot do otherwise. An example of such a proposi tion is the first principle.48 The second kind of evidence is valid, only if the 47 In Metaph. II q. 1 (fol. 8vb). 48 In Metaph. II q. 1 (fol. 8rb): 'E t vocatur evidentia propositionis simpliciter, quando ex natura sensus vel intellectus homo cogitur < siv e necessita tu r > (Ed: sine necessitate), ad miraculous intervention of God is excluded. B ut if we assume the common course of nature, we m ay confidently assent to propositions like 'All fire is w arm ,' and this kind of evidence is sufficient for the principles and conclusions of n atural science.49 W ith this qualification, the possibility of certain knowl edge is guaranteed:
Ideo conclusum est corollarie, quod aliqui valde mali dicunt volentes interi mere scientias naturales et morales, eo quod in pluribus principiis et conclusio nibus non est evidentia simplex, sed possunt falsifican per casus supernaturaliter possibiles, quia non requiritur ad tales scientias evidentia simpliciter, sed sufficiunt predictae evidentiáe secundum quid, sive ex suppositione. Ideo be ne dicit Aristoteles secundum huius, quod non in omnibus scientiis mathema tica acribologia est expetenda. E t quia iam apparuit quod omnibus predictis modis firmitas veritatis et firmitas assensus sunt nobis possibiles, ideo conclu dendum est quod querebatur, scilicet quod nobis est possibilis comprehensio veritatis cum certitudine.50
We m ay conclude th a t B uridan has avoided a petitio principii, because he only claims a conditional evidence for th e principles proper to natural science, whereas evidentia simpliciter is required for the first principle. It is doubtful, however, whether B uridan was aware th a t he came close to begging the ques tion, because his reason for introducing evidentia secundum quid alongside evi dentia simpliciter has nothing to do with the reservations we made with regard to the validity of his argum entation.
In introducing conditional evidence, he was necessitated by the requirem ents of Christian theology: there had to be room for miracles. At the same time, conditional evidence was introduced to express the fact th a t natural effects take place ut in pluribus. T h at is th a t they take place on the assum ption of the common course of nature, which m ay be impeded so th a t the effect is produced ut in paucioribus. The standard example for such effects was th a t men are born with ten fingers ut in pluribus, but th a t men have been known to have been born a t tim es -ut in paucioribus or a casu -with eleven fingers. It was a common medieval doctrine, already im plicit in Aristotle, th a t nature can be assumed to run its common course and th a t chance occurrences may be ex cluded, if one wishes to know something of causes and future events.51 assentiendum proposition! ita, quod non potest dissentire, et huiusmodi evidentia secundum A ristotelem conveniret primo principio complexo, u t p ate t quarto huius.' 49 Cf. In Metaph. II q. 1. These passages have also been transcribed and discussed by Maier, 60 Cf. foregoing note. 51 For this reason I do not quite agree with th e interpretation th a t B ottin, La scienza 135 has given of the evidentia ex suppositione: '... egli [Buridan] pero difende la d ottrina occamista del possibile intervento divino nelle leggi di n atu ra e di consiguenza costruisce una scienza puram ente congetturale e ipotetica, ' and (op. cit. 210-11) : 'Infatti, Giovanni Buridano, ben ché cerchi di evitare con ogni cura le ingerenze a livello scientifico della teologia e benché The introduction of evidentia secundum quid or ex suppositione was based on a long tradition. It m ay be found in Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William Ockham, and m any more medieval authors.52 As we have seen, A utrecourt drew an im portant methodological consequence from the theological excep tions: it is impossible to know when the supposition of the common course of nature is validly applied.53 B ut in the passages known to me, B uridan shows no signs of acquaintance with this line of reasoning. For this reason and because of our conclusions from B uridan's argum entation in his com m entary on the Physics I q. 4, it is my conviction th a t B uridan did not know the doc trines of Nicholas of A utrecourt in any detail. The only resemblance I have been able to establish is th a t B uridan was in touch w ith the line of thought th a t evident knowledge of the existence of b m ay not be inferred from the knowledge of the existence of a if a and b are distinct, which also occurs in the works of A utrecourt. B uridan even considers this argum ent as threatening the possibility of knowledge of causal relations, b u t he seems to be unaware of the subtle ways A utrecourt used this basic idea in his attacks on causal knowledge.
cerchi di smorzare molte delle polemiche relative appunto alla possibilità di uno diretto intervento divino nelle cause naturali, in realta elabora egli stesso una epistemologia nella quale il " casus supernaturaliter possibilis" e continuam ente preso in considerazione.' To my mind, the case of a divine intervention is too much stressed here. G. Federici-Vescovini, 'Arti' e filosofia nel secolo X I V (Florence 1983) 35-36 makes a connection between th e suppositio naturalis and induction which is not altogether clear to me. H er way of presenting the problem gives the impression th a t 'supposizione natu rale' has som ething to do w ith 'supposi zione del communis cursus naturae. ' 52 Cf. Maier, K ontingenz und Zufall) . A quinas' posi tion on this point is discussed in A. Van A last problem m ust be clarified. W hy was it so im portant for B uridan to m eet the argum ents th a t denied the possibility of causal knowledge? The im portance he attached to the problem m ay be seen in the fact th a t he devoted the whole of question 4 to this refutation. The answer is rather simple. As we have already seen, B uridan agreed with the A ristotelian notion of science. According to the Aristotelian view a thing is scientifically known when its causes are known (Anal. Post.,71M 0-12):
Scire autem opinamur unumquodque simpliciter, sed non sophistico modo quod est secundum accidens, cum causam cognoscere arbitramur propter quam est res, quoniam illius est causa, et non contingere hoc aliter se habere.54
The claim of his opponents, however, th a t all dem onstrations should be reduc ible to the prim um principium would render such causal explanations impos sible.
It was in this context th a t B uridan enunciated his second difficulty (B): 'Quae res sint causae vel ilia principia et quae res sint etiam ilia principiata vel causata?'55
His conclusions make it clear th a t for B uridan the principle of causality is active on two levels. On the first level, th e knowledge of the premisses in any dem onstration (quia or propter quid) is the cause of the knowledge of the conclusion, and this cause is an efficient cause.56 On the second level, the relation between cause and effect both in a dem onstration quia and in a dem onstration propter quid is founded on the res which are known. T hat is to say, there is a habitudo causae ad causatum on the level of things in reality. (M athe m atical dem onstrations are an exception to this rule. They are called propter quid, because in them inference is made from propositions which are better known to us by nature to propositions which are less known to us.)57 55 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6ra); cf. above. 56 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6ra): Secunda conclusio est quod in omni dem onstratione -sive quia, sive propter quid -scientia praem issarum est causa scientiae co n clu sio n is... et secundum Linconiensem huiusmodi causalitas est in genere causae efficientis.
67 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6rb): 'Ego credo quod com m uniter in dem onstrationibus m athem aticis non est ex parte rerum significatarum per medium et per term inos conclusionis habitudo causae ad causatum vel econversa. Sicut est aliquando in naturalibus propter quid ita est in m ath em aticis. . . . Sed tam en illas dem onstrationes m athem aticas solemus vocare propter quid, quam vis ex parte rerum significatarum non sit habitudo aliqua causae ad causatum . Non enim solum attendim us ad causalitatem scientiae et ad scientiam et vocamus dem onstra tionem propter quid quae procedit ex propositionibus natu raliter evidentibus et magis scitis ad propositiones dubitabiles et ignotas sciri per illas magis scitas, et sic est in m athematicis. Ubi autem ex parte rerum est habitudo causae ad causatum , nos aliter distinguimus demon strationem quia et propter quid, sicut ante dictum est.' Thus inferences of the existence of b from the existence of a m ust be allowed, aliter etiam perirent demonstrationes verae et propriae propter quid, cum maxime propinqua sit et essentialis habitudo causarum ad causata, eo quo causata habent esse per causas et propter suas causas. Ideo, cum dictum sit quod ex scientia unius potest nobis fieri scientia alterius, hoc maxime debet concedi, quod ex scientia causarum potest nobis fieri scientia causatorum.58
The point is th a t a position according to which all scientific principles m ust be reduced to the prim um principium would lead to the destruction of science as it was conceived by Aristotle. The same thought was expressed some years later by Pierre d 'Ailly:
Secundo sequitur, quod non posset sufficienter inferri ex una re alia nec ex causa posset concludi effectus nec e contra, et sic perirent omnes demonstra tiones naturales.59
III. Co n c l u s io n
The passages of Nicholas of A utrecourt discussed here were taken, for the m ost part, from his Letters. As is well known, m any theses taken from the Letters and from the Exigit were condemned in 1346. B ut A utrecourt pointed out to his judges th a t the doctrines proposed in the correspondence with Ber nard of Arezzo were stated disputatively. He had agreed with B ernard to take the primum principium as the standard of certain knowledge and to explore where this would lead.60 It is difficult to decide w hether Nicholas was sincere or this rem ark was merely a tactical maneuver. B u t neither of these possibili ties affects our exposition. My purpose has been to contrast two different 58 In Phys. I q. 4 (fol. 6rb) . B uridan's conviction th a t a relation exists between cause and effect is also expressed further on in the same question (fol. 6va): 'Ubi autem esset determ ina tio per naturam non concurrente actu libero voluntatis, ego crederem quod semper ex causis sufficientibus positis sequeretur effectus, nisi interveniret im pedim entum .' 59 Transcription in Maier, 'Das Problem ' 411. The context of d 'Ailly's observation is: 'quod loquendo de evidentia secundum quid seu conditionalis vel ex suppositione, scilicet stante Dei influentia generali et cursu naturae solito nulloque facto miraculo talia possunt esse nobis sufficienter evidentia, sic quod de ipsis non habem us rationabiliter d u b itare.' D oubting this kind of evidence would entail m any inconveniences and absurdities, the second of which has been m entioned above.
60 Lappe, Nicolaus 35.17-25: 'Beverendissimis patribus notum sit quod, quando m agister Bernardus predictus et ego debuissem disputare, concordavimus ad invicem disputando conferre de primo consensu omnium principio, posito a philosopho quarto Metaphisice, quod est: " Impossibile est aliquid eidem rei inesse et non inesse," loquendo de gradu evidentie qui est in lumine naturali strictissimus. Istis suppositis dixi in predictis epistolis, eo quod tales conclusiones nec im plicite continebant contradictionem nec explicite, u t tunc dicebam causa collationis. E t in hoc consistit totum m otivum quod tunc h abui.' concepts of science, one which claimed th a t there is but one ultim ate principle of science, the prim um principium , and another which claimed th a t there are nearly as m any principles as there are conclusions.
We m ay, therefore, summarize the results to which these different options lead. One of the consequences of A utrecourt's point of departure is th a t he m ust abandon the possibility of knowing causal relations. N either experience nor logic is able to provide us with this kind of knowledge. A utrecourt's strict conception of certitude entails the destruction of science in the A ristotelian sense. W hat remains is a science of mere tautologies, for only those inferences are evident in which antecedent and consequent are identical. B uridan's position is Aristotelian. He leaves intact the possibility of know ing causal chains, and for this reason he is able to assert th a t there are m any indem onstrable principles of sciences which may be known by way of induc tion. His assum ption of the existence of causal routines is in reality an a priori assum ption. B ut it is a necessary assum ption for m aintaining the possibility of induction. The very same presupposition underlies the maxims th a t Scotus and Ockham form ulated to render inductively known principles indubitable. At the same time, it is by way of induction th a t causal routines are discovered, or perhaps better, th a t reality is structured along causal chains.
I hope to have throw n a little light on the way induction and causality were intertw ined in the fourteenth-century debate. I m ust reject M aier's portrayal of this debate. I have tried to argue not only th a t a direct confrontation between A utrecourt and Buridan never took place, but also th a t their opinions diverged prim arily because of A utrecourt's refusal to make gratuitous assum p tions about causality. The standards he set for certain knowledge do not allow him to m ake such presuppositions. Some anonymous, or perhaps illusive, op ponents of B uridan seem to have held the same standards. B uridan attacked them because he saw these standards as a th re a t to the relation he supposed to exist between cause and effect, and therew ith to the A ristotelian concept of science. I cannot say th a t the option B uridan has chosen is more rational, but it is certainly more Aristotelian and perhaps (as is often the case with Aristotel ian positions) more in accord with common sense. In daily life men arrange their experiences in conceptual frameworks of cause and effect. In doing so, they suppose th a t they are doing more th an simply observing repetitions of a sequence of events. A utrecourt's option was completely different. A dialogue between their two concepts of science is not really possible.
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